Abstract This paper studies a principal-agent game where the principal commits to an affine contract. When the one-shot game is repeated the principal adjusts the contract according to the myopically behaving agent's reactions. We derive convergence conditions for fixed-point iteration as an adjustment scheme. The analysis is based on parameterizing the contract so that we obtain a degree zero homogeneous system of equations, where the nonlinear mapping satisfies Walras' law.
Introduction
This paper considers the question of reaching the complete information outcome of a principal-agent game by iterative adjustment of the contract. We assume that the principal commits to a contract which is an affine mapping of the agent's actions. The contract determines principal's action for agent's moves and for a given contract the agent chooses a utility maximizing action. An important example of a contract design game is a pricing model where the principal is a seller who designs a price-amount tariff, see Refs. 2-4. Our formulation of the contract design problem is inspired by some early papers in the field of control theory and differential games. Affine contract design problems, or affine incentive design problems as they are called in these papers, and their relation to incentive problems in economics is discussed in Ref. 5 . For mathematical analysis of affine incentive design problems in dynamic game settings of complete information see Refs. [6] [7] [8] . For recent studies, see Refs. 9 and 10. Adjustment of affine reaction rules has been recently studied in Ref. 11 , where all the players adjust their strategies whereas in this paper only one party, the principal adjusts his strategy.
Since contract design problems typically involve incomplete information on agent's preferences, they have been mostly studied in Bayesian framework. The principal is usually assumed to know the agent's utility function except for a single parameter, the agent's type, over which there is a probability distribution. In literature these games are known as adverse selection problems. The question of reaching the complete information equilibrium of such games has not raised much attention. See, however, Ref. 12 on adjusting a linear wage contract by using a three-phase procedure. In the fields of oligopolistic markets and exchange economies there is a long tradition in the stability analysis of equilibria, i.e., in the analysis of dynamic processes that lead to the complete information equilibrium even with limited information. In the recent literature of game theory, reaching the equilibrium has been considered from the learning point of view, see Ref. 13 .
This study takes the stability approach to the contracting problem: The game with the same players is played repeatedly and the principal adjusts the contract according to the observations on the agent's behavior. The principal does not need any information on the agent's utility function, e.g., prior distribution over the type parameters. Mathematically the problem is on finding affine equation constraints such that the agent's optimum under these constraints equals the principal's optimum which is the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the complete information game. We show how this outcome can be reached by adjusting the contract with fixed-point iteration when supposing that the agent acts myopically, i.e., the agent does not consider any other future periods than the next one. Thus, we are not considering the long term contracting problem that arises when the agent does not behave myopically.
Our main result on the convergence of the adjustment process is based on a new convergence theorem for fixed-point iteration. Namely, we show that fixed-point iteration converges when the system of equations is characterized by Walras' law and an additional condition that is remarkably close to the classical stability condition of Walras' tâtonnement process given in Ref. 14. Since the complete information equilibrium can be reached with limited information, this paper shows that the incomplete information problem, i.e., the adverse selection problem can be resolved by adjusting the contract. Compared to the usual Bayesian adverse selection models, the main benefit of the stability approach is that no type parameterization is needed, i.e., no prior information on the form of agent's utility function is required. Moreover, the stability approach does not require restricting only to the case of two variables which is often a crucial feature in contract design models. However, the stability approach works when there is only one agent. When there are several myopically behaving agents that the principal can meet, then it is still possible to compute the optimal contract without explicitly knowing the utility functions when the initial distribution of agents is known, see Ref. 15 . If the utility functions are known except for a type parameter that has an unknown distribution, then the optimal contract and the correct distribution can be learned by Bayesian updating, see Ref. 16 .
Unlike in the literature on dynamic processes in oligopolistic competition, we do not assume that the players are making predictions on each other's future behavior. Classical example of a dynamic process where the players make such predictions is the Cournot process in which the firms assume that their rivals use their previous actions also in the future. The predictions of firms' future actions can also be more complex and they may evolve in time, see Refs. 11 and 17. There are also plenty of papers on dynamic oligopolies where one or several of the firms take into account that their rivals play their best responses to other firms' latest actions, see e.g., Refs. 18-20. Although the timing of actions in principal-agent games is similar to that of Stackelberg oligopolies, the results from the literature on dynamic oligopolies do not apply to the principal-agent setting. This is because the principal conditions his actions on agent's moves by offering a contract and the agent may also reject the contract. Since the agent's action depends on the offered contract, the principal cannot make predictions on agent's responses similarly as in the oligopolistic games.
The contents of the paper are as follows. In Section 2 we derive the complete information solution of the affine contract design problem, i.e. subgame perfect outcome. In Section 3 the game is parameterized such that the contract design problem can be formulated as a system of equations to be solved. Section 4 shows how fixed-point iteration can be used in adjusting an affine contract when the two-player game defined in sections 2 and 3 is played repeatedly. In Section 4 it is assumed that the principal's optimum is such that the agent always participates the game when the contract passes through that point. In Section 5 we characterize processes for finding the principal's optimum even in the case where the agent does not always participate the game.
Principal-Agent Game and the Complete Information Solution
In this section we define the principal-agent game and derive conditions for the existence of an affine contract that leads to the principal's optimum, i.e., subgame perfect outcome, when there is complete information. There are two utility maximizing players, a principal and an agent with utility functions v, u : R n × R m → R, respectively. The principal's decision variable is y ∈ R m and the agent's is x ∈ R n , · denotes the Euclidean norm in R m , R n , as well as in their product space. The principal offers the agent a contract γ : R n → R m and commits to act according to it. The agent may reject the contract in which case he obtains his reservation utilityū. After the agent chooses accepts the contract he makes a move x ′ . The principal observes the agent's move and implements the contract, i.e., chooses the action y ′ = γ i (x ′ ), and the game ends. There is a wide variety of applications for principal-agent games. For example, the principal could be a seller who offers a buyer a price tariff that specifies the prices y of the goods for any amounts x to be bought. Nonlinear pricing with a multi-product monopoly has been studied, e.g., in Refs. 2, 3, and 4. The adverse selection literature considers contract design settings in which the principal has incomplete information on agent's utility function. Usually it is assumed that the agent's utility function is determined by a type parameter θ ∈ {θ 1 , . . . , θ N } that is unknown for the principal, who, however, has a probability distribution over the possible values of the parameter. The agent knows his own type. For an overview on adverse selection see, e.g., Chapter 2 of Ref. 21 .
In this paper we do not assume type parameterization. Furthermore, in this and the next section the principal is assumed to have complete information, that is to say he knows the agent's utility function or type. We present conditions under which the principal gets his optimum with a single affine contract. In the following sections we show how the complete information equilibrium can be reached with limited information by adjusting the contract.
In this paper a contract specifies a price, a wage etc. for all feasible actions that the agent can take. For discussion on various contracts that induce the complete information outcome, see Chapter 7.2 in Ref. 22 . Note that the complete information outcome is a single x, y-pair. On the other hand, in adverse selection literature the mere optimal solution, which contains an outcome for each type θ, is often called a contract.
The complete information contract design problem can be alternatively seen as a one-sided incentive problem studied in Refs. 6-8. These papers deal with complete information settings in which one of the players is in the position of conditioning his actions on other players' behavior. Indeed, our analysis in this section is inspired by these papers. Instead of using the terminology from these papers we prefer using the concepts from contract design literature, e.g., the notions principal and agent instead of leader and follower, because they are more widely used in the literature dealing with contracting.
The principal's contract design problem is defined as follows. Find a contract γ :
and we also assume that
Equation (2) is called the agent's participation constraint. We next show that there is an affine contract of the form
where L is a linear mapping (m × n matrix) from R n into R m , and y 0 is a fixed vector in R m , that solves the contract design problem.
Suppose that x * , y * solves max
where D is the set of points that satisfy the agent's participation constraint u(x, y) ≥ū. Because the pair x * , y * is the best outcome the principal can hope to get in the game, we can restrict our attention to those affine contracts that pass through x * , y * , i.e., y * = γ(x * ). Thus for any contract of the form (3) we should have y 0 = y * − Lx * . Hence, we can without loss of generality assume that the principal gives his contracts in the form
Note that since the contract goes through x * , y * , which belongs to D, the agent will get at least his reservation utility when accepting the contract. Thus he will always participate the game. It is assumed that there are no constraints other than the participation constraint for the principal's and the agent's decisions. If there were other constraints that were commonly known, then these constraints could be taken into account in the agent's maximization problem (1) as well as in the definition of D. For example, in a buyer-seller game it is be common knowledge that only positive amounts can be sold or there may be additional capacity limitations for the seller.
The affine contract design problem can now be defined as follows. Find a contract of the form (4), i.e., find an m × n matrix L such that x * , y * solves
The contract γ that solves the above problem is called a contract at x * , y * and the pair (x * , γ) is a Nash equilibrium for the game.
Let us suppose that the agent's objective function u is concave and let us denote the set of all subgradients of u at x * , y * , i.e., the subdifferential of u at x * , y * , by ∂u(x * , y * ). A subgradient at x * , y * means a pair (ξ x , ξ y ) ∈ R n+m that satisfies
where the superscript T denotes the transpose of a vector or a matrix. The subdifferential of a concave function u is a non-empty set and if the function is differentiable at x * , y * then the subdifferential is a singleton and equals the gradient of u at x * , y * . For given L necessary and sufficient optimality condition for (5), (6) at x * , y * is that
Geometrical interpretation of condition (7) is that there is a subgradient of u at x * , y * that is normal to the affine set defined by (6) . Now, suppose that (ξ x , ξ y ) ∈ ∂u(x * , y * ) is such that ξ y = 0. Then there is a contract of the form (6) at x * , y * . One possible L satisfying (7) is given by
Usually there are also other affine contracts than the one defined by (8) . Suppose, e.g., that the dimension of x equals the dimension of y, i.e., m = n, and suppose (ξ x , ξ y ) ∈ ∂u(x * , y * ) is such that all components of ξ y are nonzero. Then we can choose L to be a diagonal matrix. In a multi-product buyer-seller situation the corresponding tariff can be specified by giving a unit price for each good to be sold plus possible fixed prices.
We collect the essential of the above discussion to the following.
Theorem 2.1 If u is concave and has a subgradient ξ x , ξ y at x * , y * such that ξ y = 0, then there is a solution to the affine contract design problem. Furthermore, a mapping of the form (4) is a contract at x * , y * if and only if the x, y points satisfying (6) belong to the hyperplane
for some (ξ x , ξ y ) ∈ ∂u(x * , y * ).
The latter part of the theorem is equivalent to the necessary and sufficient optimality condition (7) . Also note that if u is differentiable the requirement ξ y = 0 becomes ∇ y u(x * , y * ) = 0, which means that the agent's utility is sensitive for the changes of y around x * , y * . Theorem 2.1 gives conditions under which the principal can get his optimum with an affine contract. This does not exclude the possibility of reaching the optimum with nonlinear contracts as well.
Parameterization of the Problem
Theorem 2.1 suggests us to parameterize the principal's problem as follows. Let us denote the subgradients of u appearing in (9) by parameter vectors p x and p y , and denote the column vector composed of p x and p y by p. The contract design problem can then be formulated as follows: Find p ∈ R n+m , p y = 0, such that x * , y * solves max
where the matrix L(p) is chosen such that the contract defines an affine subset on the hyperplane
The hyperplane (11) can be interpreted as a budged constraint which says that the value of pair (x, y) should be the same as the value of the pair (x * , y * ) when the prices of x and y are given by p x and p y , respectively.
An appropriate parameterization for L is given by
for p y = 0. Because the contract is chosen to satisfy (11), L becomes, regardless of its explicit form, degree zero homogeneous, i.e., L(αp) = L(p) for α = 0. This is because αp defines the same hyperplane as p. Let S(p) ⊂ R n+m denote the set of solutions to (10) for given p. Then the contract design problem above is to find p so that (x * , y * ) ∈ S(p).
Theorem 2.1 gives conditions for the existence of a solution for (13) , and due to the degree zero homogeneity of L, there is at least a ray of solutions if the conditions of Theorem 2.1 hold. One can always obtain a system with a unique solution from a homogeneous system that has a unique ray of solutions, e.g., by setting one of the components of p to a nonzero constant and dropping the corresponding equation from the system. However, here we do not have any need to do so. Furthermore, we do not necessarily have a unique ray of solutions. Note that if (x(p), y(p)) ∈ S(p), then x(p) is the agent's reaction for the contract parameterized by p. Furthermore, as a solution set of a convex optimization problem, S(p) if non-empty, is a convex set. The other properties of S are summarized in the following theorem, which readily follows from Theorem A.1 and Corollary A.1 presented in Appendix A. Theorem 3.1 If u is concave, L is continuous at p and S(p) = ∅, then the set-valued mapping S is closed at p. If u is strictly concave and D is compact, then S is single-valued and continuous at p, p y = 0.
Notice that the compactness of a level set, e.g., the set D, of a concave function is equivalent with the compactness of all the level sets, see, e.g., Corollary 8.7.1 in Ref. 23 . Obviously strongly concave functions satisfy conditions of Theorem 3.1. Strong concavity of u means that −∂u is a strongly monotone mapping, i.e., there is a constant σ > 0 such that
If u is twice continuously differentiable, then strong concavity is equivalent with the negative semidefiniteness of ∇ 2 u(x, y) + σI for every x, y pair, where ∇ 2 u denotes the Hessian of u with respect to x and y and I is an identity matrix. We shall see in the following section that strong concavity is essential for the convergence of fixed-point adjustment.
If there were other constraints in the problem than just the participation constraint, then the continuity properties of Theorem 3.1 would hold as long as these other constraints are such that the feasible region of the agent's optimization problem is convex and compact.
A two-dimensional example of points x(p), y(p) with L(p) defined by (12) is presented in Figure  1 . In the figure the agent's optimum with a given p and the corresponding contract line (dashed line) is a point where the contract line is tangent to one of the contours (dotted lines) of u. The solid line represents the locus of all x(p), y(p) points. In the figure K denotes the (negative) cone of solutions of (13) . The opposite directions are solutions as well. 
Adjustment with Fixed-Point Iteration
In a game of incomplete information the explicit form of u is unknown for the principal. As explained earlier, the principal-agent game with incomplete information is usually formulated as a Bayesian game by supposing that the principal knows u except for one parameter and has a probability distribution over the possible values of that parameter.
Instead of Bayesian approach the game of incomplete information is played repeatedly and the principal can adjust the affine contract according to observations on the agent's actions, i.e., the principal is committed to a contract only for one period at a time and faces the same or similar agent in each round. Note that when u is unknown to the principal he cannot necessarily have prior knowledge about the agent's participation constraint; hence he cannot use D when solving for (x * , y * ) as in Section 2. We shall therefore assume here that the principal knows that his global optimum (x * , y * ), solving max v(x, y) over R n+m , belongs to D. Thus the agent will always participate the game, recall the discussion in Section 2 below (4). For example, this can happen when it is common knowledge that the agent does not have a participation constraint at all. In Section 5 we study the general case where the principal does not know D but can find the best point in D through adjustments.
The basic idea of the adjustment approach is that the principal tries to find a solution p so that (13) holds. An appropriate method for this task is fixed-point iteration
where d denotes the mapping
, and µ = 0 is a fixed parameter. The initial parameter p 0 can be chosen according to some prior data on agent's behavior, e.g., the principal may have faced another agent in the past. It may also happen that the preferences of the agent change and the principal has to adjust the contract as the agent does not behave as in the past. Then the previously known optimal contract gives the initial guess. Alternatively, the initial parameter can be simply a guess. Indeed, we shall see that iteration () converges for most choices of p 0 and the initial parameters need no be close to a solution of (13) . The advantage of fixed-point iteration is that it can be implemented in a repeated game where the principal does not know u. This is because the agent's response x(p) and y(p) as defined by the affine contract are sufficient information for updating p by (4). For example, Newton's method requires derivatives of x(p) and y(p) which are not available. Moreover, d(p) is homogeneous of degree zero, i.e., d(αp) = d(p) for all scalars α = 0, which implies that the Jacobian of d is not invertible.
Although the iteration (4) is not motivated by a long term optimization criteria it has intuitive appeal that comes from interpreting p x and p y as prices for x and y. Namely, then d(p) tells how much there is excess demand for (x, y) compared to their supply (x * , y * ). If the demand exceeds the supply for some component of (x, y), i.e., d i (p) > 0 for some i, then the price of that variable increases, and in the opposite case it decreases. These kind of price adjustment processes have been studied extensively in the literature on exchange economies.
Another interpretation for the above adjustment scheme is that it describes a learning model, where the iteration specifies the principal's learning rule. This interpretation is possible because the iteration (4) requires only information that is naturally available for the principal, i.e. agent's responses to given contracts. For example, derivatives of d are not required. The learning interpretation requires that the agent is assumed to be myopic in the sense that he does not consider outcomes of other games than the current one. An explanation for myopic behavior is that the agent's discount factor is small compared to the speed at which the learning rule converges. Another argument for myopic learning comes from matching models where there are a large number of players and in each period randomly chosen players meet each other. Since the same players are unlikely to meet anew they tend to play myopically.
When relaxing the assumption of myopic agent, we need to consider the players' information on each others. In particular, we need to specify the agents' ability to predict principal's future contracts. If the agent is aware of principal's updating scheme, then he is able to manipulate the future contracts and drive the process to a non-optimal point for the principal. On the other hand, the presence of fully rational and long-lived agent seriously undermines the motive for short-term contracting. Nevertheless, in such settings it would be reasonable to evaluate various adjustment schemes by using a long-term optimization criteria such as discounted sum of payoffs.
Convergence Analysis
The convergence analysis of this section is based on the properties of the parameterized problem (13) . We show essentially that the strong concavity of the agent's utility function is required for the convergence of (4).
Because L is degree zero homogeneous, S and d are homogeneous, too. Moreover, d(p) is perpendicular to p, i.e., d(p)
T p = 0, because the contract satisfies (11) . This property is known as Walras' law and it generally holds for excess demand functions of exchange economies. In the following lemmas we give general convergence conditions and characterize the convergence properties of fixed-point iteration in a problem of finding a solution for a system of equations, where the nonlinear mapping satisfies Walras' law together with an additional condition.
The proofs of the lemmas can be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 4.1 Let the continuous mapping F : B(p * , r) → R N , B(p * , r) = {p ∈ R N | p − p * < r}, r > 0, satisfy the following conditions:
Then fixed-point iteration
Lemma 4.2 Let conditions 1 and 2 of Lemma 4.1 hold for F and let fixed-point iteration p k+1 = p k + µF (p k ) converge to a solutionp that satisfies
for some α > 0. Then the iteration converges monotonically, i.e., p k+1 −p < p k −p .
The latter lemma tells that the convergence is monotonic if the sequence of parameters p converges to a solution, e.g., to p * that satisfies the second condition in Lemma 4.1. This can be guaranteed in some specific cases as will be seen in the example of Section 4.2. Monotonic convergence guarantees that the solution is approached in each step. The number of steps required to reach the exact solution is, however, usually infinite. For computational purposes we can use a stopping criteria such as p k −p * ≤ ε for the iteration, in which case the number of iterations will be finite and dependent on the desired accuracy ε.
The importance of Walras' law in the field of exchange economies raises the question whether fixedpoint iteration works also as a tâtonnement scheme for exchange economies. Indeed, Ref. 1 shows that this is the case. Moreover, it can observed that the classical stability condition of Walrasian equilibrium presented in Ref. 14 is the limiting case from the Condition 2 of Lemma 4.1 when σ goes to zero and F is the excess demand function of the economy.
Using Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 we obtain the following convergence theorem for the adjustment of an affine contract using fixed-point iteration.
Theorem 4.1 If u is strongly concave and assumptions of Theorem 2.1 hold, then fixed-point iteration (4), for p 0 y = 0, either converges to a solution of (13) or p k y = 0 for some k. If the iteration converges to a subgradient direction of u at x * , y * , then it converges monotonically.
Proof. As a strongly concave function u satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 and it follows that d is continuous when p y = 0. Clearly condition 1 of Lemma 4.1 holds for all p with p y = 0. Therefore we need to show only that condition 2 holds. Without loss of generality we can choose µ = 1. Let (x, y) ∈ S(p), (ξ x * , ξ y * ) ∈ ∂u(x * , y * ) as in Theorem 2.1 and (ξ x , ξ y ) ∈ ∂u(x, y). From strong concavity we have
where σ > 0. By plugging the contract in place of y we get from the second term on the left-hand side of
and hence the left-hand side of (16) 
From the optimality condition it follows that ξ x + L(p) T ξ y = 0; hence the left-hand side of (16) is equal to ξ
where p * = 0 denotes a vector that is composed of ξ x * and ξ y * . Note that the right-hand side of (16) Theorem 4.1 shows that fixed-point iteration is an appropriate method to compute the solution for the contract design problem. Moreover, in a repeated game the iteration describes a convergent learning rule for the principal and we may say that the equilibrium of the game is stable. Note that it is obvious from Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.1 that when the initial parameter vector p 0 is chosen close enough to a solution the iteration does not stall at a point with p k y = 0. If there were commonly known constraints for the agent's optimization problem other than the principal's contract, then convergence can be obtained provided that the constraints are such that (x(p), y(p)) is continuous. Strong concavity guarantees that (x(p), y(p)) stay inside a sufficiently large ball for both the unconstrained and the constrained case. Hence, we would have continuity and the condition 2 of Lemma 4.1. Condition 1 is guaranteed by the fact that agent's choices satisfy (11).
Example
The purpose of this example is to illustrate the geometrical ideas of the convergence analysis. Let us assume that the agent's utility function is
and the principal's optimum is achieved at x * = 1, y * = −1. As a minimum of two strongly concave functions u is also strongly concave but it is not differentiable for all x, y. Contours of u are illustrated in Figure 1 . Because the example is only two-dimensional (11) defines the contract uniquely by (12) .
The graph of S consists of four parts given below:
The first three parts in x, y-plane are marked in Figure 2 . Part IV is the point (1, −1). Notice that S and d are not defined when p y = 0 and therefore there is a discontinuity at x = 1, y = 0. The discontinuity is not, however, illustrated in the figure. The first convergence condition of Lemma 4.1, namely that d(p) is perpendicular to p, was explained in the second paragraph of Section 4.1 and it is illustrated in Figure 1 . The geometric interpretation of the second convergence condition in Lemma 4.1 for d is that the image of {(p x , p y ) ∈ R n+m | p y = 0} under d is contained in a ball. This can be seen by writing the condition in an equivalent form
i.e., the ball is centered at p * and has radius p * . This condition is now satisfied and the dashed line in Figure 2 illustrates one appropriate ball when the origin is transformed to (1, −1) .
In general, strong concavity of u implies that the level set {(x, y) ∈ R n+m | u(x, y) ≥ u(x * , y * )} is contained in a sufficiently large ball that goes through x * , y * . The region inside the dotted line in Figure 2 belongs to the aforementioned level set. Because the points (x(p), y(p)) are inside the level set and d(p) is the difference vector of (x * , y * ) and this point, d is inside the ball obtained from the one that contains the level set by transforming the origin to (x * , y * ). Notice that the condition 2 of Lemma 4.1 has both global and local interpretation. Globally the condition implies that d(p) belongs to a compact set and in the vicinity of p * it means that d is not too flat. In this example y is one-dimensional and therefore all the solutions of (13) 
Processes for Finding the Principal's Optimum

Complete processes
So far we have assumed that the agent will always participate the game during the process, i.e., the principal's global optimum (x * , y * ) belongs to D, recall the discussion in the beginning of Section 4. If (x * , y * ) does not belong to D, the agent does not necessarily participate the game. In this case the principal's task is to find the optimal point for v over D and a corresponding contract at that point. In this section we characterize procedures for finding the principal's optimum assuming that a contract can be found at any given (x * , y * ) ∈ D, e.g., with the adjustment process described previously in this paper.
Let w = (x,ȳ) ∈ R n+m , we call w a reference point, and let S(p, w) denote the set of solutions to max x,y u(x, y)
for given p and w, where L(p) is as in (10) . Now the contract design problem is to find w * such that v(w * ) = max w∈D v(w) and p * ∈ G(w * ), where G(w) = {p | w ∈ S(p, w)}. We assume now that given any w ∈ D, a parameter vector p that defines the contract at w, i.e., p ∈ G(w), can be found. Namely, given that u is strongly concave, and for all w ∈ D there is ξ y = 0, (ξ x , ξ y ) ∈ ∂u(w), the convergence result of Theorem 4.1 holds for any reference point w ∈ D. In addition, we make the following assumptions for the adjustment of reference point w:
1. The reference point w k ∈ D is updated only if a strictly better point w k+1 ∈ D can be found.
If it holds that
The first assumption is natural because there is no reason for the principal to expect less utility from the future rounds than from the previous ones. Furthermore, it is rather easy to generate better reference points, so that the second assumption is reasonable, too. For example when the current reference point is in the interior of D, one can find a better reference point that is also in the interior of D by taking an appropriate step to an improving direction of v at the current reference point. It is also worth noticing that if the reference point is taken outside of D, an affine contract going through that point will usually have points in common with D. Nevertheless, the agent will reject the contract at some stage of the updating procedure. In that case some of the agent's previous choices can be taken as a new reference point.
We further need the concept of complete process. We say that a process is incomplete if the sequence of reference points converges tow but there is a non-trivial process that starts fromw and satisfies assumptions 1 and 2. By a non-trivial process we mean a sequence {w k } k generated by the process withw 0 =w, such thatw k =w at least for some k. Process that is not incomplete is called complete. Similar concept of a complete process in the price adjustment framework has been used in Ref. 24 .
The following theorem shows that a complete adjustment processes, which satisfies the above assumptions, converges and there is a subsequence of contracts converging to the solution of the contract design problem.
Theorem 5.1 When v is strictly concave, then for any complete process, which begins from w 0 ∈ D and satisfies assumptions 1 and 2, the sequence of reference points converges to w * . Furthermore, when u is strictly concave, and for all
Proof. Let us first observe that due to assumption 2 and the assumption that w 0 ∈ D the sequence of reference points {w k } k , obtained during the process, belongs to D. Let us now show that this sequence converges to the principal's optimum over D, i.e., to point w * . There are two possibilities: either w k = w * when k > N , or for every k we have v(w k+1 ) > v(w k ). In both cases v is a Lyapunov function for the subsequence. Hence the subsequence converges and the limit is in D, which is a closed set because u is continuous. Notice also that v is strictly concave and w * is its unique maximizer over D, so that it is an appropriate Lyapunov function. From the completeness assumption it follows that the limit is w * . It follows from the continuity of S, see Corollary A.1, that G(w) is a closed mapping. Because of homogeneity of S we may choose a bounded sequence {p
, where w k ∈ D, e.g., we may set p k = 1. This sequence has a convergent subsequence and from the closedness of G it follows that the limit is in G(w * ) when G(w * ) = ∅. Hence we have the result.
In view of Theorem 5.1, iteration (4) can be started using any reference point w ∈ D, and as we discussed it is rather easy to generate reference points. When during an iteration a point (x(p), y(p)) is encountered, giving the principal a better outcome than the current reference point, it can be taken as a new reference point in iteration (4), which can be continued from the current parameter vector.
Example
In this example the principal is selling two goods, amounts of which are x 1 and x 2 . The price charged from bundle x = (x 1 , x 2 ) is y 2 . The cost of producing x is 2x 1 +x 
for the agent. The agent's net utility is obtained by subtracting the price y 2 from this. Hence, the agent's utility is u(x, y) = 5(
The principal offers the agent a price-amount contract
The variable y is squared to guarantee strong-concavity of u. Note that, if u was linear in y, then it would not be strongly concave. Since the principal is in a position of setting the price, there is no restriction in assuming that the price is y 2 . In addition to the participation constraint, amounts x i , i = 1, 2, are assumed to be positive. These constraints plays role only when the principal updates the reference point.
This example also demonstrates how the principal's optimum can be found when the reference point is updated in a feasible direction which is computed similarly as in the method of Zoutendijk, see, e.g., Section 10.1 in Ref. 25 . We assume that u is differentiable. This guarantees that for each feasible w j the corresponding p which gives w j as the agent's optimal choice, points towards the direction of u(w j ), i.e., p = λ∇u(w j ) for λ = 0. The algorithm proceeds as follows. The principal sets w j and updates p until termination criteria
is met, or the agent has not participated. In the latter case the reference point is updated by taking a smaller step to an improving feasible direction than before. In the first case the principal updates the reference point either to the direction d = ∇v(w j ), or if the reference point has been updated by a step smaller than ε, then the new reference point is chosen such that it improves both principal's and agent's utilities. As in the method of Zoutendijk, an improving feasible direction is found by maximizing the minimum of d T ∇u P (w j ) and d T p/ p . If the solution of this problem is obtained at d = 0, then d is an improving feasible direction and otherwise an optimum has been found.
The procedure is summarized below.
Step 0. Choose a reference point w 0 that satisfies the agent's participation constraint. Choose non-zerō p ∈ R n , scalars ν ∈ (0, 1), µ = 0, s 0 > 0, and ε ∈ (0, s 0 ). Set j = 0 and k = 0 and go to Step 1. Step 1. Perform fixed-point iteration with p 0 =p for given w j until termination criteria has been met (Case 1), or the agent does not participate (Case 2). Let p denote the reference point in Case 1 when the termination criteria is met. In Case 1 go to Step 2. In Case 2 go to Step 3.
Step 2. If v(x(p), y(p)) > v(w j ), set w j+1 = (x(p), y(p)), k = 0, increase j, and go to Step 1. Otherwise generate a new reference point as follows. If s k < ε, assume that at the last feasible reference point the participation constraint is active. Feasible direction d is then chosen by solving max min{d Step 1 are presented as gray bars. The same initial guess p 0 =p is used whenever the reference point is updated although it could be possible to accelerate the process by choosing the initial parameter vector among previous parameter vectors.
The first eight feasible reference points improve the principal's utility about 159%. The eighth feasible reference point is the 29th of all the reference points, i.e., agent has not participated in 21 periods. Altogether it takes 89 periods of repeated play to reach the 29th reference point. As can be seen from the figure, after the 29th reference point the procedure converges rather slowly towards the optimum. Rapid convergence in the first few steps and slow convergence after that is typical for gradient based methods such as the one used here. When the 64th reference point is reached, p is updated 107 times altogether. It takes 170 periods of repeated play to reach this point. During this time there has been 52 periods in which the agent has not participated. Principal's utility 
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a new adjustment approach for an affine contract design problem. When a principal-agent game with incomplete information is played repeatedly, the principal can adjust his contract according to the agent's previous move. The adjustment procedure is based on parameterizing the problem appropriately and updating the parameters with fixed-point iteration.
The parameterization of the contract design problem results to a degree zero homogeneous system of equations, where the mapping satisfies Walras' law. We showed that the iteration converges when an additional condition, the condition 2 of Lemma 4.1, holds for the system. As a result we obtained a convergence result for a principal-agent game where the agent has a strongly concave utility function.
The idea of using linear constraints in coordinating decision makers to a desired outcome has been used in the context of Walras' tâtonnement and recently in negotiation analysis. In Ref. 26 a method of finding a Pareto-optimal solution for a two-party negotiation is formulated as a problem of searching for a joint tangent hyperplane for the parties utility functions. This problem results also to a degree zero homogeneous system of equations that satisfies Walras' law. As Refs. 1 and 27 show, the convergence results presented in this paper are useful for adjustment of hyperplane constraints in finding Pareto optimal solutions or more generally adjustment of linear budget constraints for exchange economies.
A Continuity Properties of the Optimal Set Mapping
Here S(p, w) ⊂ R n+m denotes the set of solutions for (17) for given p and w = (x,ȳ). The following theorem characterizes the continuity of S with respect to p and w.
Theorem A.1 If u is concave, L(p) is continuous at p and S(p, w) = ∅, then the set-valued mapping S is closed at (p, w).
Proof. Let us assume that S(p, w) = ∅, p k → p, w k → w and (x k , y k ) → (x, y), where (x k , y k ) ∈ S(p k , w k ) = ∅. We denote the set of feasible points of problem (17), i.e., the set of points satisfying the linear contract, with C(p, w) and the normal cone of the feasible set, {(ξx, ξy) ∈ R n+m | ξx + L(p) T ξy = 0}, with N (p). Let us first note that C(p, w) is a closed mapping with respect to (p, w), because L is continuous.
According to sufficient optimality conditions (x k , y k ) ∈ S(p k , w k ) if and only if (x k , y k ) ∈ C(p k , w k ) and
From continuity of L it follows that N is a closed mapping. Concavity of u implies upper hemi-continuity of ∂u. Moreover, ∪ (x,y)∈{(x k ,y k )} k ∂u(x, y)
is bounded, see, e.g., Prop. 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 in Section 6 of Ref. 28 . Hence, there is a convergent sequence {ξi}i such that ξi ∈ ∂u(x k i , y
It follows that limi→∞ ξi ∈ ∂u(x, y) ∩ N (p). Because C is a closed mapping we have (x, y) ∈ C(p, w). Thus, sufficient optimality conditions are satisfied and (x, y) ∈ S(p, w). Proof. From the compactness of the level sets we know that D is compact and S(p, w) = ∅. The latter follows from Weierstrass theorem. Strict concavity of u implies that S(p, w) is a singleton. Furthermore, since D is compact there isw = (x,ȳ) such that u(x,ȳ) = max (x,y)∈D u(x, y) and clearly S(p, w) ⊂ {(x, y) ∈ R n+m | u(x, y) ≥ u(x,ȳ)} so that S is a closed mapping into a compact set. Hence S is upper hemi-continuous, see, e.g., Prop. 11.9 (c) in Ref. 29 .
Continuity follows from upper hemi-continuity and single-valuedness, see prop 11.9 (d) in Ref. 29 .
B Proofs of the Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 4.1: If function F satisfies the conditions 1 and 2, then they hold also for µF with µ = 0. Hence, without loss of generality we can prove the convergence with µ = 1. Let p * be as in condition 2, then
Note that p k ∈ B(p * , r) ∀k = 0, 1, . . ., when p 0 ∈ B(p * , r). Therefore the sequence { p k − p * } k converges and the sequence { p k } k is bounded. From condition 1 it follows that
so that { p k } k is a growing and bounded sequence and hence convergent. From the iteration formula we have
Hence p 0 + P k−1 i=0 F (p i ) converges, too. From triangular inequality we get
nd it follows that
when k → ∞ and l ≥ 1. Thus {p k } k is a Cauchy sequence and hence convergent; letp denote its limit point. Moreover, from (18) we get by setting l = 1 that F (p k ) → 0, and from the continuity of F we have F (p) = 0. We can construct a sequence of solutions converging to p * by taking neighborhoods B(p * , r k ) with r ≥ r 0 > r 1 > ... > r k → 0. There is a solutionp k in each of these neighborhoods, andp k → p * since r k → 0. From the continuity of F we have F (p * ) = 0.
